Bettingen camping equipment

Camping Rangau has varying vegetation and has a file of old trees. There are also neatly paved pitches that are suitable for campers or preferable for your camping equipment on less sunny and wet days. The campsite is located on a small lake Grosser Bischofsweiher, , m2 of water surface where water sports are possible and a bit further along a sandy beach.

On the campsite you will find play opportunities for children. In In , a playground was created, with various wooden seels. In the neighborhood you can rent boats, go cycling and hiking, visit a bird sanctuary and there is a trim park. A special feature is that around Pentecost one has a special party, the Erlanger Kirchwei, which lasts about ten days.

With music, dance, theater, plenty of things to strengthen the inner man. He directed, in effect, little more than movement to assembly areas closer to the German border in preparation for the co-ordinated attack to be launched on 14 September. Interpreting the order to mean sending only reinforced patrols against the West Wall for the moment, the infantry division commanders obviously anticipated no immediate breakthrough of the fortified line.

The corps armor, in turn, was merely to reconnoiter the West Wall with patrols and provide a demonstration by fire "to conceal our real intention to make the main effort in the north half of [the] Corps zone. Having attempted to resolve the conflict by stationing the infantry divisions near the northern corps boundary, General Gerow then had to depend upon his armored division to cover the great gap between the infantry and the Third Army.

Thus he in effect had demoted his armor to the role of a cavalry group, which meant that the weight of the armor would be lost to him in at least the initial stages of his attack. Meeting with his three division commanders on 10 September, General Gerow revealed his desire to get the armor into the fight if possible. He directed the 5th Armored Division to demonstrate to its front and be prepared to assault the West Wall on order, all the while holding out one combat command [39] prepared on short notice to exploit any breakthrough achieved by the infantry.

The difficulty, for example, was clearly reflected on 11 September at First Army headquarters where General Gerow and the army commander, General Hodges, engaged in "an occasionally rather tempestuous discussion" over the V Corps plan. Aware of "the importance that General Bradley [12th Army Group commander] placed on the strength of the right flank," Hodges insisted that an infantry regimental combat team be attached to the armor on the right.

General Gerow gave the role to the 28th Division's th Infantry. Possibly also as a result of General Hodges' views, Gerow on 11 September enlarged the armored division's assignment by ordering that if the armor found the West Wall in its zone lightly held, it was to attack to seize objectives in the south that would protect and promote the main advance in the north while at the same time lessening the gap between the First and Third Armies.

Already familiar were the sharp ridges, deeply incised ravines, numerous streams, dense forests, and restricted road net of the Ardennes. Attacking through the Eifel meant more of the same but with the added obstacle of the West Wall. All along the V Corps front the West Wall was a single belt of fortifications in greatest density along a possible avenue of approach southwest of the Schnee Eifel, the high wooded ridge just across the Our River and the German border.

See Map II. Along the Schnee Eifel itself the Germans had depended so much upon the rugged terrain that they had built fewer fortifications than at any point from Aachen south and southeast to the Rhine. The objectives assigned the divisions of the V Corps were based upon three distinct elevations lying astride the route of advance. The first was the Schnee Eifel, extending unbroken for about fifteen miles from Ormont to the vicinity of the village of Brandscheid where it develops into a high, relatively open plateau.

The 4th Division was to seize the crest of the Schnee Eifel to facilitate advance of the 28th Division across the plateau. Farther south the plateau is blocked by dense woods and sharp, cliff-like slopes to a point between Vianden and Echternach. Here exists a suggestion of a corridor through which the 5th Armored Division was to advance upon order to take high ground about the village of Mettendorf.

The second elevation, taking the form of a high north-south plateau, lies beyond the Pruem River. At the western edge of the plateau lie the towns of Pruem and Bitburg. Though these towns have a population of only a few thousand, they are among the largest in the Eifel and are important communications centers. The infantry in the north was to take Pruem; the armor in the south, to secure Bitburg.

Beyond the second elevation lies the little Kyll River, barring access to a third, high mountain-like plateau which slopes, grooved and broken, to the Rhine. Across this plateau the divisions were to make the final advance on Koblenz, some fifty miles inside the German border. To cover the gap, the d Cavalry Group was to screen and maintain contact with cavalry of the VII Corps and was to be prepared to advance eastward along the upper reaches of the Kyll through what is known as the Losheim Gap.

The location of the 28th Division minus one regimental combat team near the right flank of the 4th Division served to effect a concentration of five regiments on a frontage of approximately fourteen miles. South of this limited concentration, the 5th Armored Division and the 28th Division's th Infantry were to cover the rest of the corps front of about thirty miles.

As General Gerow was aware, he had achieved, for all his efforts, no genuine concentration for the attack. Yet the very fact that the corps had been assigned a rugged route of advance like the Eifel meant that American commanders still were thinking in terms of pursuit warfare. If pursuit remained the order of the day, the spread formation was acceptable, even in front of a fortified line like the West Wall. Available intelligence gave no reason for concern. The V Corps G-2, Col. Thomas J.

Ford, predicted that the corps would meet only battered remnants of the three divisions which had fled before the corps across Belgium and Luxembourg. It was possible, Colonel Ford added, that the corps might meet parts of the 2d SS Panzer Division, known to have been operating along the corps north boundary.

Of four divisions nominally under General Keppler's command, two had been so depleted that Keppler had merged them with another, the 2d SS Panzer Division. This division was to [41] defend the Schnee Eifel. Between them the 2d Panzer and 2d SS Panzer Divisions could muster no more than 3 nominal panzer grenadier regiments, none with greater strength than a reinforced battalion; 2 engineer battalions; 2 signal battalions; 17 assault guns; 26 mm.

To this force might be added the nondescript garrison troops actually in position in the West Wall in this sector, but these were so few that they could have manned no more than every fifth position. The corps, army, and army group boundaries ran through the southern part of the V Corps zone along a line Diekirch-Bitburg. Because the German unit boundaries did not correspond to the one between the First and Third U. Armies, the V Corps attack was to strike the inner wings of both German army groups.

Commanded by General der Infanterie Dr. This was the 5th Parachute Division, which, like some of General Keppler's units, had little left except a name. To a nucleus of the division headquarters and a company of the reconnaissance battalion, General Beyer had attached a security regiment, a motorized infantry regiment, and a few miscellaneous units of company size.

The division had neither armor nor artillery. It consisted only of a panzer grenadier battalion of company strength, an engineer company, six mm. Although the corps was destined on 14 September to receive a regiment and a light battery of a division newly committed in Lorraine, the addition hardly would make up for the over-all deficiencies in the command. As the Commander in Chief West had recognized, this was a big assignment. As late as 10 September Field Marshal von Rundstedt had warned that he needed another five to six weeks to restore the West Wall.

That very day he had been so perturbed by a gap which had developed between the First and Seventh Armies that he had authorized General Beyer's LXXX Corps to leave only rear guards behind in Luxembourg and to fall back on the West Wall. This move obviously foreshadowed a quick end to any hope that Keppler's I SS Panzer Corps might continue to hold beyond the West Wall; for it had left General Keppler without even a guise of a southern neighbor.

On 11 September, for example, the 2d SS Panzer Division possessed no ammunition for either its mm. Reports reaching Seventh Army headquarters the night of 11 September to the effect that the 2d Panzer Division had found the Americans already in possession of a number of West Wall bunkers for a while confirmed the Germans' worst apprehensions. German commanders breathed only slightly more easily when a new report the next day revealed the penetration to be the work of reconnaissance patrols.

The race for the West Wall was over. Technically, the Germans had won it; but so soon were the Americans upon them that the end results looked much like a dead heat. Into Germany As the divisions of the V Corps began moving toward the German border early on 12 September, it was obvious that [43] General Gerow's plan of piercing the West Wall on a broad front with limited means could work as a genuine corps maneuver only if attended by considerable success.

Because the various divisional attacks were to occur at relatively isolated points, only after attainment of unequivocal breakthrough could the divisions unite in concerted, mutually supporting maneuver. The V Corps attack thus began as three separate operations: the 4th Division on the Schnee Eifel, the 28th Division on the plateau southwest of the Schnee Eifel, and the 5th Armored Division far to the south. The first of the three divisions to come full against the West Wall was the 28th in the center, both because the fortifications in the 28th Division's sector extended farther to the west and because the division commander gave a relatively broad interpretation to the authorization to make a reconnaissance in force.

Norman D. Cota, 15 had issued a field order directing, in essence, a minor reconnaissance in force. His two regiments the third was attached to the 5th Armored Division were to "attack" during daylight by sending strong patrols to feel the way and by closing up before dark to hold gains made by the patrols.

In deference to the twelve- to fifteen-mile width of the division zone and to the unknown caliber of the enemy, neither regiment was to commit to action more than one reinforced battalion. The route of approach was the closest thing to a natural corridor leading into Germany in this sector, even though it consisted of steep, broken terrain served by a limited road net.

Though the pillboxes here were in but one band, they were dense and fronted by an almost continuous line of dragon's teeth antitank obstacles. On the right wing, the th Infantry Col. William L. Blanton moved toward the village of Roscheid, which rested in a bend in the West Wall. Through Roscheid the regiment was to converge with the th Infantry Col. Theodore A. Seely on high ground around Uettfeld.

By nightfall of 12 September a battalion had crossed a bridge over the Our River secured earlier by a patrol and had advanced unopposed through outpost pillboxes to the village of Sevenig, separated from Roscheid by the muddy course of the little Irsen creek.

To the north, the th Infantry also sent a battalion across the border to take up positions for the night west of Grosskampenberg, a village about yards short of the dragon's teeth on a road [44] leading through Kesfeld to Uettfeld.

The objective of Uettfeld lay about two miles beyond the dragon's teeth. It was the report of the 2d Panzer Division's encounter with 28th Division reconnaissance patrols which disturbed the febrile Seventh Army headquarters into belief that the Americans had won the race for the West Wall. Even the clarification of the matter later on 12 September could have afforded little relief to the panzer division commander, General der Panzertruppen Heinrich Freiherr von Luettwitz.

Although the line remained inviolate, the Americans had camped on the threshhold. Luettwitz' hope of stopping a thrust the next day, 13 September, rested mainly with three tanks and eight assault guns. Moving directly from the scramble of pursuit warfare, the 28th Division was not ready for an attack on a fortified line. Neither of the two regiments had received special equipment needed in pillbox assault, such as flame throwers and explosive charges. Attached tank and self-propelled tank destroyer units still were repairing their pursuit-damaged vehicles and had yet to come forward.

The infantry would face the West Wall with direct fire support only from organic mm. Few units of the division had more than a basic load of ammunition, enough perhaps for a meeting engagement but not for sustained fighting. So concerned about the ammunition shortage was the division commander, General Cota, that he forbade unobserved artillery fires except previously registered concentrations and others specifically approved by his headquarters.

In addition, both regiments of the 28th Division would be restricted for still another day to committing but one battalion to action. For all these problems, a battalion each of the th and th Infantry Regiments attacked the West Wall early on 13 September. Trying to cross the Irsen creek to gain a foothold among the pillboxes on high ground west of Roscheid, a battalion of the th Infantry failed even to reach the creek.

Rifle and automatic weapons fire from the pillboxes brought the attackers up sharply more than yards away from the West Wall. A battalion of the th Infantry met a similar fate halfway between Grosskampenberg and the line of dragon's teeth. Pinned to the ground by small arms fire from the pillboxes, the men were ready prey for German mortar and artillery fire. Though both attacking battalions tried to use towed antitank guns for direct fire support, enemy gunners endowed with superior observation made sudden death of the efforts.

Indirect artillery fire did little damage to the pillboxes other than to "dust off the camouflage. Along with a company of tanks, the th Infantry was plagued all day by antitank fire and mines and by a natural tank trap in the muddy Irsen creek bot- [45] tomland. At heavy cost the regiment finally seized a strip of forward pillboxes more than a mile wide but fell short of taking Roscheid.

Two miles to the north, the th Infantry renewed the attack toward Kesfeld while sending a battalion around to the north through the village of Heckhuscheid to move southeast on Hill , a West Wall strongpoint along the Heckhuscheid-Uettfeld highway. Once again the regiment found that without direct fire support the infantry could make no headway against the pillboxes. The battalion southeast of Heckhuscheid found the way barred by dragon's teeth and a roadblock at the base of Hill and could get no farther.

Though the battalion near Kesfeld had tried during the night to bring up explosives to blast a path through the dragon's teeth for tanks, the explosives had blown up unexplainably and killed the men who were carrying them. Arriving in midmorning, the tanks could provide little assistance because they could not get past the dragon's teeth and because poor visibility restricted fire against distant targets.

Advance might have been stymied indefinitely had not 2d Lt. Joseph H. Dew maneuvered his tank to within a few feet of the dragon's teeth and methodically blasted a path with his mm. From prisoners, both regiments learned something of the desperation with which the Germans had tried to man the West Wall. Many pillboxes, prisoners revealed, still were unmanned, and others contained only two or three men armed with rifles and an occasional machine gun or panzerfaust. Gathered from almost every conceivable source, many of the men had arrived in the line only the night before.

Complaining bitterly about having to fight, a forty-year-old cook said he was captured little more than two hours after reaching the front. These revelations must have galled those American troops who had fought so hard to effect even these two small punctures in the German line.

James C. Ford, the th Infantry S-3, spoke for them when he said: "It doesn't much matter what training a man may have when he is placed inside such protection as was afforded by the pillboxes. Even if he merely stuck his weapons through the aperture and fired occasionally, it kept our men from moving ahead freely. Seeing the first punctures of the line as the hardest, the V Corps commander, General Gerow, ordered the 5th Armored Division to send an officer that night to advise the 28th Division on use of armor in event of a breakthrough the next day.

The 5th Armored Division's Combat Command B, located northwest of Diekirch, was ready to move through if the infantry forged a gap. When the next day came, General Gerow saw his hopes quickly dashed. Even before the th Infantry could get an attack going on 15 September, a small counterattack forced two platoons to relinquish some ground.

For the next two days the th Infantry was to fight in [46] vain to get past Roscheid and secure a hill that provided damaging observation off the regiment's right flank. In the process, the enemy's 2d Panzer Division gradually chewed the regiment to pieces. Battered by German shelling, the American riflemen could not be trusted to hold the positions already gained.

In at least two instances they fell back in panic before limited objective counterattacks. So poor was the showing that General Cota subsequently relieved the regimental commander. Through most of 15 September the situation in the th Infantry's sector appeared equally discouraging. The 1st Battalion, commanded by Lt.

Floid A. Davison, was to try again to take Hill ; but the late arrival of tanks and of engineers equipped with explosives to blow the troublesome roadblock precluded early success. Not until did the engineers arrive. The plan at this point was for the engineers to advance to the roadblock under cover of fire from the tanks and a platoon of towed tank destroyers. Blowing of the roadblock was to signal the start of an attack by infantry and tanks.

Ten unarmed engineers, each carrying a pound load of TNT, began to creep slowly, carefully toward the roadblock. Though the day was foggy, the engineers felt naked. As they inched forward, tension mounted, passing almost electrically to the waiting infantrymen and tankers. Reaching the objective at last, the engineers found that the roadblock consisted of six steel I-beams emplaced in concrete caissons on either side of the road. Large portable iron tetrahedrons reinforced the whole.

Working swiftly, they placed their charges. Shortly after , an hour and a half after start of the tedious journey, the engineers completed their work. Activating the charges, they jumped to their feet. In the words of their lieutenant, they "went like hell to the rear. Acting on cue, the tanks fired pointblank at the pillboxes. The infantry went forward on the run. In about forty-five minutes the battalion had stormed the objective, Hill It yielded seventeen pillboxes and fifty-eight prisoners.

After almost three days of mounting casualties and frustrations, the th Infantry in a quick, coordinated assault at last had gained a significant objective within the West Wall. The regimental commander, Colonel Seely, planned for his two committed battalions to converge the next day upon the regimental objective of Kemper Steimerich Hill Hill , key to the commanding ground around Uettfeld.

In order to better the jump-off position and to narrow a gap between the two battalions, the fatigued battalion west of Kesfeld sent a company in late afternoon to clear a nest of pillboxes in the direction Of Hill As darkness came, Company F under Capt. Robert H. Schultz completed the mission. Sending back more than fifty prisoners, the men began to settle down for the night in and about the pillboxes they had captured.

The first sign of an impending counterattack came about half an hour after midnight. The men could hear tracked vehicles moving through the darkness toward Company F's positions. On guard at the time at a pillbox occupied by the company's rear command group, Pvt. Roy O. Fleming said later, "Suddenly everything became quiet. I could hear [47] the clank of these vehicles. I saw the flame thrower start and heard the sounds of a helluva scrap up around Captain Schultz's position.

We are having a counterattack—tanks, infantry, flame throwers. By the time the messages could be exchanged and artillery brought to bear, the action had subsided. Company Fs radio apparently was defective, capable of sending but not of receiving. The situation thus was so obscure that Colonel Seely dared not risk immediate commitment of his reserve. What happened remained a mystery difficult to piece together from the fragments of information provided by the few men who escaped.

The Germans apparently had attacked with about seventy to eighty men reinforced by two flame-throwing vehicles. A prisoner captured some days later said the vehicles were improvised flame throwers constructed from Schuetzenpanzerwagen armored half-tracks. As late as two days after the event, Company F could muster no more than forty-four men, including cooks and supply personnel.

The news of Company Fs disaster dealt a heavy blow to the optimism engendered by the success of the preceding afternoon. Only a few hours before the Germans hit Company F, General Cota had expressed "high hopes" about the division's prospects. Delayed again by the late arrival of supporting tanks and unassisted by the rest of the regiment, Colonel Davison's 1st Battalion nevertheless attacked again in midmorning of 16 September.

Assisted by effective counterbattery artillery fires, the battalion quickly seized Losenseifen Hill Hill , adjacent to Hill and one of the highest points in the 28th Division's sector. Leaving a company to hold the hill, the 1st Battalion continued to attack and stopped for the night only after capturing Spielmannsholz Hill Hill , less than a thousand yards short of the regimental objective overlooking Uettfeld.

In a day of rapid, determined advance, Colonel Davison's men had progressed a mile and a half past the dragon's teeth and had captured some of the most commanding ground for miles around. Beyond them lay only scattered West Wall fortifications. Though the penetration was narrow and pencil-like, the 28th Division had for all practical purposes broken through the West Wall.

It was ironic that even as Colonel Davison's men were achieving this feat, General Gerow was visiting the division command post with orders to call off the offensive. Having incurred almost 1, casualties, the two regiments of the 28th Division were in no condition to expand or exploit the th Infantry's narrow penetration. During the next few days, the th and th Infantry Regiments jockeyed for position, while the Germans registered their protest with small counterattacks and continued shelling.

Battle of the Schnee Eifel A few miles to the north, the 4th Division in the meantime had been more conservative in interpreting the authority to reconnoiter in force but had experienced more encouraging initial success. The action took place on the imposing ridge line east of St. Vith, the Schnee Eifel. Preceded by combat patrols, the 4th Division had resumed eastward march on 12 September. By nightfall the next day two regiments had crossed the border and moved into assembly areas in the shadow of the Schnee Eifel.

On the north wing, the 12th Infantry Col. James S. Luckett assembled at the village of Radscheid; the 22d Infantry Col. Charles T. Lanham nearby at Bleialf. Impressed by a lack of opposition, the division commander, Maj. Raymond O. Barton, ordered both regiments to push reconnaissance patrols forward; but he reserved any real attempt to move into the West Wall for the next day, 14 September, the day General Gerow had designated for the V Corps attack.

This information did nothing to alter General Barton's anticipation that only a crust of resistance stood between the 4th Division and a breakthrough operation. Rodwell was to remain in division reserve. Commanders of the two forward regiments designated initial objectives astride a lateral highway that follows the crest of the Schnee Eifel. These regiments also were to protect the division's exposed flanks, for to the southwest, closest units of the 28th Division were more than four miles away, and to the northwest, the closest friendly troops, except for a thin veil of cavalry, were twenty-five miles away.

The attack on 14 September was, at the start, more a reconnaissance in force than anything the division had attempted dur- [49] ing the two preceding days. Although the regiments had intended to attack together, the 22d Infantry was delayed until noon while awaiting arrival of an attached company of tanks and then used, according to plan, but one infantry battalion. The 12th Infantry intended to employ two battalions, but one took a wrong trail upon entering the forest and contributed little to the day's action.

Thus the 4th Division attacked on 14 September in no greater strength at first than the 28th Division had employed the day before. Screened by a drizzling rain, the 12th Infantry on the left advanced virtually unimpeded up the steep western slopes of the Schnee Eifel. The only battalion to make actual contact with the West Wall found the pillboxes undefended. Cutting the Schnee Eifel highway without difficulty, the battalion turned northeast along the highway toward the wooded high ground of Bogeyman Hill Hill , the Schwarzer Mann.

Only here did the battalion encounter a defended pillbox. Accompanied by tanks, the infantry moved along firebreaks and trails to outflank and carry the position. The men dug in for the night on Bogeyman Hill, all the way through the fabled West Wall. Resistance had been so light that the infantry had called only once for supporting artillery fire.

A mile to the south, the leading battalion of the 22d Infantry had been nearing the woods line east of Bleialf when a round from an mm. As the crewmen piled from the tank, the other tanks maneuvered about on the open hill. Thinking the tanks were withdrawing, the riflemen began to fall back in a panic. The attack might have floundered on this discreditable note had not unit commanders acted aggressively to bring the men under control.

In about twenty minutes their charge carried not only to the woods line but past a row of pillboxes all the way to the crest of the ridge. Like the 12th Infantry, the 22d Infantry had achieved an astonishingly quick penetration of this thin sector of the West Wall. To enlarge the penetration, the regimental commander, Colonel Lanham, quickly committed his other two battalions. One continued the drive to the east to gain the woods line on the eastern slope of the ridge while the other joined the assault battalion in fanning out to right and left to roll up the line of pillboxes.

Some of the fortifications turned out to be undefended, and the enemy had manned the others predominantly with middle-aged men and youths who had little unit organization and less conception of tactics. One or two rifle shots against embrasures often proved persuasion enough to disgorge the defenders, hands high. Only to the southwest at a crossroads settlement on the Bleialf-Pruem highway did the Germans fight with determination, and here close-in fire from self-propelled tank destroyers had a telling effect.

By the end of the day the 22d Infantry held a breach in the West Wall about two miles wide. One battalion had reached a position on the eastern slopes of the Schnee Eifel overlooking the village of Hontheim, a mile and a quarter past the forward pillboxes.

The wooded section at upper left is the edge of the Schnee Eifel. The division commander, SS-Brigadefuehrer und Generalmajor der Waffen-SS Heinz Lammerding, set out immediately to try to contain the penetration; but the strength available to him still was unimpressive, even though he had received a few new attachments upon withdrawal behind the border. He had about men in four organic battalions and 1, in nine attached battalions, a total of about 2, To support them, he had 14 mm.

Two other tanks were in the repair shop. The corps commander, General Gerow, apparently shared this view, for it was during the night of 14 September that he directed an officer of [51] the 5th Armored Division to advise the 28th Division on the use of armor in event of a breakthrough.

Though the greatest success had been in the 4th Division's sector, the terrain along the Schnee Eifel discouraged use of armor there. Having virtually walked through the West Wall, General Barton acted on 15 September both to broaden his effort and speed the eastward advance.

He comitted [sic] his reserve, the 8th Infantry, in a motorized advance along the best axial highway in his zone to skirt the northern end of the Schnee Eifel along the narrow corridor afforded by the valley of the upper Kyll, the Losheim Gap.

The regiment was to occupy a march objective on the north bank of the Kyll six miles inside Germany. The 12th Infantry meanwhile was to sweep northeastward along the Schnee Eifel for several miles in order to uncover roads leading east. The 22d Infantry was to turn southwest to take Brandscheid, a village within the West Wall at the southern end of the Schnee Eifel.

These objectives accomplished, the 12th and 22d Infantry Regiments were to renew the eastward drive to seize march objectives fourteen miles away on the Kyll. If the 8th Infantry could push rapidly, the Schnee Eifel could be outflanked and the West Wall left far behind. Starting early from the border village of Schoenberg, the 8th Infantry ran into blown bridges and roadblocks almost from the beginning. A heavy mist also slowed the column and for the second straight day denied tactical air support.

At the border near the village of Losheim the column hit definite resistance.

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